

REMARKS

Claims 1-6, 8-11, 13-18, 20-24, 27, 28, and 31-33 are all of the claims that have been examined. By this Amendment, Applicant adds new claim 34. Hence, claims 1-6, 8-11, 13-18, 20-24, 27, 28, and 31-34 are all the claims pending in the application.

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

Rejection of Claims 1, 4-6, 9-11, 15, 17, 18, 24, 31, and 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

Claims 1, 4-6, 9-11, 15, 17, 18, 24, 31 and 32 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly unpatentable over Watanabe et al. (US 4,825,201, hereinafter “Watanabe”) in view of Mayer, III et al. (US 6,690,337, hereinafter “Mayer”). Applicant respectfully traverses.

Regarding claim 1, Applicant submits that, contrary to the Examiner’s assertion, Watanabe does not teach “a casing for integrally accommodating [the] plurality of flat panel displays.” The Examiner asserts, without support, that such a casing is “inherent”. Applicant submits that this assertion is without merit, as the Examiner must provide a rationale or evidence tending to show inherency. See MPEP 2112 (IV). Watanabe teaches arranging several screens to display a larger image. See Watanabe Abstract. Applicant submits that there is no necessity that these screens all be in the same casing. They could just as easily be independent screens arranged next to one another.

Applicant further submits that Watanabe does not teach “a power source common to [the] plurality of flat panel displays.” The Examiner cites to Fig. 2 of Watanabe, element 4. Yet as described in col. 3 line 66-col. 4 line 13 of Watanabe, Fig. 2 describes a remote box for adjusting volume and display of plural displays. The power supply depicted in it only powers the

components of the remote box. It is not a power supply for any of the flat panel displays, let alone a common power supply for all of the displays, or for all components of the system. For example, the controller (Fig. 3) also has its own power supply. Applicant submits that there is no express or implicit teaching in Watanabe of the common power supply claimed in the present application.

Applicant further submits that Watanabe does not teach individually measuring “luminance gradation characteristics” of each display and setting the maximum luminance value of each display “to a predetermined value equal to or smaller than a maximum luminance value of a flat panel display in which the maximum luminance value is lowest.” Although Watanabe does teach adjusting the brightness of the displays and correcting them so that they match (see Watanabe col. 5 line 53-66), it does not teach independently determining the maximum luminance of each display and setting the maximum luminance of the displays according to the results of such a determination.

The Examiner concedes that Watanabe does not teach the individual display components, such as display dimensions of 1200 x 1600 or higher, and the pixel size. The Examiner cites Mayer to make up for the deficiency. However, Mayer merely discloses a display dimension of 1280 x 1024, and does not specify any pixel dimension. Applicant submits that the numbers cited by the Examiner do not even suggest the display dimensions as claimed, and hence any modification to the display resolution of Mayer would not inherently include the aspect ratio as claimed. Therefore, Applicant submits that the Examiner has failed to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness.

For the above reasons, Applicant submits that claim 1 is patentable over the cited art, and respectfully requests that the rejection be withdrawn.

Regarding claim 6, Applicant submits that Watanabe does not teach that at least one of the plurality of flat panel displays is different from the others in terms of screen size, pixel size, number of pixels, or aspect ratio. Whenever Watanabe discusses the screens, it refers to them as interchangeable, i.e. substantially similar to one another. Col. 2, line 16-33, summarizing the invention, refers to the display panels as a group, and does not specify that any one is significantly different from the others in any way. The section cited by the Examiner, col. 2 line 16-19, only states that the screens are arranged so as to form a larger picture image screen. Therefore, Applicant submits that Watanabe does not teach the features of claim 6, and claim 6 is patentable over the cited art.

Regarding claim 9, the Examiner asserts that Watanabe teaches that the plurality of flat panel displays may include one or more flat panel displays that display a color image. The Examiner fails to assert that Watanabe teaches one or more flat panel displays that display a monochrome image, or a control unit which judges whether an image to be displayed is a color image or a monochrome image. Applicant submits that Watanabe in fact teaches away from having monochrome screens. Col. 1, line 13-20 of Watanabe describes the field of the art as being only multi-color displays. Therefore, Applicant submits that claim 9 is separately patentable over the cited art.

Regarding claim 10, the Examiner asserts that it is rejected for the same reason as claim 9. Even ignoring the issue that claim 9 is patentable over the rejection, claim 10 does not claim

the same features. Additionally, Watanabe does not teach the features of claim 10, i.e. a color flat panel display which is used as an interface for controlling image displaying in each of the other displays. In Watanabe, the display control is embodied in a separate control box, not on any of the screens. See Watanabe col. 3 line 3-18. Therefore, Applicant submits that claim 10 is separately patentable over the cited art.

Regarding claim 17, the Examiner asserts that it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Watanabe and Mayer, “because this would provide the power supply to the display panels.” (see 2/21/2008 Office Action, page 5). The display panels of Watanabe presumably already have a power supply. The Examiner has even asserted in the rejection of claim 1 that there is such a power supply. See Office Action, page 2, section 3. Therefore, Applicant submits that providing a power supply is insufficient reason for a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine Watanabe and Meyer, and as a result the Examiner has failed to present a *prima facie* case of obviousness. Applicant therefore submits that claim 17 is separately patentable over the cited art.

Regarding claim 18, the Examiner again cites to Watanabe Fig. 2 as showing the power supply for the display screens. As discussed above with regard to claim 1, this is incorrect. The power supply depicted in Watanabe Fig. 2 is the power supply for the control box, and does not power the display screens. Watanabe has no teaching towards having a single common power supply which supplies driver power to all the screens. Therefore, Applicant submits that claim 18 is separately patentable over the cited art.

Applicant further submits that, as claims 4-6, 9-11, 15, 17, 18, and 24 all depend from claim 1, these claims are patentable at least by virtue of their dependencies.

Regarding claim 31, as presented above, Watanabe does not teach “a power source common to said plurality of flat panel displays.” Therefore, Applicant submits that claim 31 is patentable over the cited art, and requests that the rejection be withdrawn.

The Examiner incorrectly asserts that claim 32 is rejected for the same reason as claim 1. First, the same argument regarding the power source as for claim 1 is applicable to the rejection of claim 32. Additionally, the Examiner has not shown that Watanabe teaches “a luminance measurement apparatus which measures a luminance gradation characteristic of each of said plurality of flat panel displays.” Applicant submits that this rejection is improper for not demonstrating that every feature of the claim is taught, and claim 32 is therefore patentable over the cited art.

Rejection of Claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly unpatentable over Watanabe in view of Mayer and further in view of Suzuki (US 6,344,836, hereinafter “Suzuki”). Applicant respectfully traverses, and submits that there is no reason for a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine Suzuki with Watanabe and Mayer.

It is not enough for the Examiner to demonstrate that all claim features may be found in the prior art. In order for the Examiner to assert a *prima facie* case of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), there must be some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings in the prior art itself, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary

skill in the art¹. However, a *prima facie* case of obviousness may not be maintained based on this test alone². Instead, the Examiner must identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does³.

Watanabe discloses a system for controlling the image quality of a plurality of flat screens arranged to display a larger image. In effect, it discloses making a large display out of several smaller displays. See Watanabe Abstract. In comparison, Suzuki discloses an information browsing system which may incorporate multiple displays, for displaying different information, or displaying the same information in different locations. (See Suzuki col. 2 line 40-67). Though they may both use display screens, these two patents use them for different ends. Therefore, Applicant submits that a person having ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine Watanabe with Suzuki.

Additionally, Suzuki does not cure the above-noted deficiencies of Watanabe. Therefore, Applicant submits that claim 3 is patentable at least by virtue of its dependency from claim 1.

¹ *Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc.*, 174 F.3d 1308, 1323-1324 (CA Fed. 1999)

² *KSR v. Teleflex*, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007)

³ *Id.* at 1741

Rejection of Claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly unpatentable over Watanabe in view of Mayer, and Inbar (US 6,119,380, hereinafter “Inbar”) and further in view of Suzuki. Applicant respectfully traverses.

In addition to the above-noted argument against combining Suzuki with Watanabe, a similar argument can be made here regarding the motivation to combine Inbar with Watanabe. Inbar teaches a transparency viewing apparatus. See Title. Applicant submits that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have no reason to combine a transparency viewing apparatus with Watanabe’s multiple flat screen display.

Additionally, the above-noted argument that Watanabe does not disclose “a power source common to [the] plurality of flat panel displays,” can be reiterated here. For these reasons, Applicant submits that claim 2 is patentable over the cited art.

Rejection of Claims 8, 16 and 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

Claims 8, 16, 33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly unpatentable over Watanabe and Mayer in view of Inbar. Applicant respectfully traverses.

Similar arguments can be made with respect to these claims regarding the motivation to combine Watanabe with Inbar. Regarding claim 33, Inbar does not teach that “whether an image to be displayed is a color image or a monochrome image is determined from a kind of diagnostic apparatus with which the image is obtained.” The Examiner cites to selections of Inbar that teach viewing transparencies. Applicant submits that there is no teaching in Inbar towards a diagnostic apparatus which decides whether an image is to be in color or black and white.

Regarding claim 8, Applicant submits that this claim recites the feature that the casing has a light box for medical film observation. Although the Examiner concedes that Watanabe and Mayer do not disclose this feature, the Examiner asserts that Inbar discloses a medical X-ray transparencies comprising a similar box, the transparencies constructed under spring-loaded film holder clips located along the top edge of the viewing surface. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious for a person skilled in the art to incorporate the teachings of Inbar to the system of Watanabe and Mayer “to hold the medical film more stable in the display system.” See Office Action, page 9, 4th paragraph.

As is clear from the Examiner's rejection of claim 2, the description in Inbar cited by the Examiner allegedly corresponds to the holding unit for holding a medical film in the present invention. Applicant submits that this same element cannot also correspond to the light box of the present invention. Therefore, Applicant submits that claim 8 is patentable over the cited art.

Additionally, as Inbar does not cure the deficiencies of Watanabe, Applicant submits that claims 8, 16, and 33 are patentable over the cited art at least by virtue of their dependencies from claim 1.

Rejection of Claims 13-14, 20-23 and 27-28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

Claims 13-14, 20-23 and 27-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly unpatentable over Watanabe and Mayer, in view of Berman et al. (US 6,448,956, hereinafter “Berman”). Applicant respectfully traverses.

First, the Examiner is asserting that Berman discloses the use of hard copies in medical analysis. (See Berman col. 1 line 43-48). However, the Examiner has been unable to show that

Berman teaches “an output unit for outputting a hard copy.” In fact, Berman is aimed at digital manipulation of a medical image (see Berman col. 1 line 49-54), which would obviate the need for hard copies. Therefore, Applicant submits that Berman does not cure the Examiner-admitted deficiencies of Watanabe or Meyer with respect to claims 13-14, 20-23, and 27-28.

Additionally, as Berman does not cure the above-noted deficiencies of Watanabe, Applicant submits that claims 13-14, 20-23 and 27-28 are patentable at least by virtue of their respective dependencies from claims 1 and 2.

Rejection of Claim 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

Claim 33 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly being unpatentable over Watanabe and Mayer and Suzuki as applied to claims 1 and 9 above, and further in view of Inbar. Applicant respectfully traverses.

As noted above, Inbar does not teach that “whether an image to be displayed is a color image or a monochrome image is determined from a kind of diagnostic apparatus with which the image is obtained.” The Examiner cites to selections of Inbar that teach viewing transparencies. There is no teaching in Inbar towards a diagnostic apparatus which decides whether an image is to be in color or black and white.

Additionally, neither Suzuki nor Inbar cure the deficiencies of Watanabe and Meyer. Therefore, Applicant submits that claim 33 is patentable at least by virtue of its dependency from claim 1.

New Claim

By this Amendment, Applicant adds new claim 34, to more particularly claim the subject matter of the present application. Applicant submits that as claim 34 is a combination of the features of claims 8 and 31, it has support in the specification, and is patentable over the cited art at least for analogous reasons as claims 8 and 31.

Conclusion

In view of the above, reconsideration and allowance of this application are now believed to be in order, and such actions are hereby solicited. If any points remain in issue which the Examiner feels may be best resolved through a personal or telephone interview, the Examiner is kindly requested to contact the undersigned at the telephone number listed below.

The USPTO is directed and authorized to charge all required fees, except for the Issue Fee and the Publication Fee, to Deposit Account No. 19-4880. Please also credit any overpayments to said Deposit Account.

Respectfully submitted,

/Susan Perng Pan/

SUGHRUE MION, PLLC
Telephone: (202) 293-7060
Facsimile: (202) 293-7860

Susan Perng Pan
Registration No. 41,239

WASHINGTON OFFICE

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Date: June 17, 2008